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At the request of the New Zealand Ministry of Transport, a meeting of UK researchers and 
commentators was convened in London on ‘peak car’, a hypothesis that per capita car use 
is close to its maximum level, and may stabilise or turn down. In both countries car traffic 
forecasts have been overestimated, though current official thinking is that recent levelling 
off and decline in car use is a temporary result of poor economic conditions, and that a 
resumption of strong growth is expected in future. Research findings include features that 
may show evidence of structural changes in the influence of economic and other drivers of 
car travel, and/or demand reaching natural saturation levels where further growth gives 
little benefit to travellers. The discussion reflected diverse experience and judgements, not 
all in agreement, and mostly related to UK experience, though influenced by a growing 
international research literature, mostly empirical in focus, showing some important 
similarities in many other countries. Key features included: 
 There have been strongly divergent trends in different locations (the main areas of 
decline being in cities, with growth continuing in many lower density areas) and 
among different groups (young men showing a decline, women an increase), with 
noticeable differences by journey purpose, length and mode (rail use has grown 
strongly at the same time as car use has fallen). As a result the trends in national 
aggregate totals have been damped, not fully revealing underlying causes, and 
disaggregate experience has varied not only in size but also in direction of change.  
 At the aggregate level, evidence of shifts in demand predates recent economic 
difficulties, including decoupling of traffic growth and economic growth, reductions in 
propensity to learn to drive, changing land use and migration trends (which had 
previously been dominated by movements to areas encouraging higher car use, 
and in the 2000s reversed), growth of internet use, and decline in traffic levels in 
London and some other urban areas. These shifts have mostly been observed in 
the 1990s and early 2000s, including periods of strong economic growth. 
 Over the same period, there have been changes in transport policy and travel 
conditions favouring public transport, walking and cycling in some places, changes 
in tax effects on prices (especially company car use), parking control, congestion 
levels, and fuel prices. It has often been the case that policy changes, though 
worthy, are deemed to have rather small effects on travel demand, but there is a 
view that the cumulative effects may have been larger than expected, the resulting 
car use levels representing a new equilibrium to the prevailing conditions.   
Taken together, these features would imply that per capita car use is influenced by both 
economic and other structural factors, cannot be converted to total traffic levels simply by 
multiplying by population, and demands serious re-examination. Although all these 
features are researchable, there is not currently a professional consensus backing either 
the official forecasts or any specific alternative, and a strong implication is that methods of 
policy formulation and project design should test robustness to a much wider span of 





Grow, peak or plateau – the outlook for car travel 
 
Part 1 – setting the scene 
Introduction 
On 20 May 2014 a roundtable meeting was convened in London involving a number of key 
UK commentators on what is now increasingly known as ‘peak car’. The event was 
organised by Glenn Lyons for the New Zealand Ministry of Transport in conjunction with 
Phil Goodwin who agreed to chair the meeting. This report captures an account of key 
issues addressed by the roundtable discussion. It is important to note that some of the key 
issues and possibilities are not necessarily unanimously owned or endorsed by all those 
who were present; and points made are not all necessarily empirically verifiable. This 
reflects the very nature of this challenging and multi-faceted topic – especially in looking to 
the future as distinct from seeking to make sense of recent trends in car travel. The event 
took place under Chatham House Rule and hence no remarks are attributed to individuals 
who attended, though written ‘on-the-record’ comments by some of the participants are 
attached as an Appendix (with their permission). 
Background 
A number of countries, including the UK and New Zealand have observed a slowing down 
of growth or even a decline in per capita car travel that has pre-dated the global economic 
downturn while also continuing through it. This phenomenon has attracted the widely used 
label ‘peak car’. Not everyone approves of the label, but there is an agreed interest in 
trying to understand better why this ‘disruption’ to a long-run trend in car traffic growth has 
occurred and what this might mean for future levels of per capita and total car travel, which 
might either resume growth, have stabilised or see decline. 
In the last two years some key sources of published material on the phenomenon have 
emerged, in which the roundtable participants have been active contributors: participants’ 
own contributions have included the following, which in turn refer to a large international 
research literature and growing evidence base. 
 Goodwin, P. (2012). Peak travel, peak car and the future of mobility: Evidence, 
unresolved issues, policy implications, and a research agenda. International Transport 
Forum round table on “Long Run Trends in Travel Demand”, Paris, OECD. Available 
at: http://www.internationaltransportforum.org/jtrc/DiscussionPapers/DP201213.pdf 
(together with contributions by authors from several other countries) 
 Le Vine, S. and Jones, P. (2012). On the Move: Making sense of car and train travel 





 Transport Reviews special issue on Peak Car (2013) edited by Phil Goodwin and 
Gordon Stokes. Available at http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/ttrv20/33/3#.U4x0IPldWSo 
(overview paper by Goodwin and Van Dender freely available – some other papers 
require journal subscription) 
 Metz, D. (2014). Peak Car – the future of travel. Available at 
http://www.amazon.co.uk/Peak-Car-Future-David-Metz-
ebook/dp/B00I8LM6TG/ref%3Dsr_1_3?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1391593211&sr=1-3 
(eBook or paperback) 
 Lyons, G. (2014). Transport’s Digital Age Transition. Forthcoming in the Journal of 
Transport and Land Use. Available on request from Glenn.Lyons@uwe.ac.uk 
In 2014 the New Zealand Ministry of Transport established four strategy director positions 
to help it address key issues for the future development of transport. Professor Glenn 
Lyons from UWE Bristol has been seconded to the Ministry and is responsible for 
supporting the Deputy Chief Executive, Andrew Jackson, in examining future demand.  
While New Zealand has been observing a flattening of total vehicle kilometres travelled 
and an overall decrease in per capita car travel (revealed by its national travel data), it sits 
in a rather different position in terms of current policy. The country has ramped up 
substantially its level of expenditure on transport from less than 1% of GDP through the 
1980s and 1990s to around 1.7% of GDP from 2010. This expenditure includes major 
construction projects to ‘complete’ the strategic road network. This could be considered to 
have parallels with the later stages of the ‘predict and provide’ era in the UK. Revenue is 
raised through a regime of hypothecation – funds for investment in transport are principally 
raised from road users. Predicting future revenue is therefore dependent on being able to 
predict future levels of road network use. A central question for New Zealand concerns the 
nature and extent of future demand for its transport system. Understanding future demand 
has increasing importance in light of New Zealand’s move towards infrastructure financing 
based on loans, the paying back of which is based on revenue from use in future years. 
With a population of approximately 4.5 million, 1.4 million of this is concentrated in 
Auckland and a further 1 million in Wellington, Christchurch and Hamilton combined. In 
terms of passenger transport, the future development of these urban centres for the 
country is particularly key. 
As part of its examination of future demand, the opportunity was taken to organise the 
roundtable meeting in London to coincide with Andrew Jackson’s visit to the UK. 
The aim in convening the meeting was to explore the future uncertainties in levels of road 
traffic – framed by the following four questions: 
1. What are the most noteworthy factors likely to have been contributing to recent 
changes in per capita car travel? 
2. What would be the assumed drivers of each of the three trajectories forward of 
grow, peak or plateau? 
3. Are these the only trajectories and to what extent might different trajectories 
concurrently prevail below the aggregate? 
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4. How should policymaking respond to the pronounced uncertainty surrounding future 
travel demand; and what does this uncertainty mean for how we invest in land 
transport and how we might look to build flexibility into the system to cope with 
uncertainty? 
 
This report has been produced as a public record of the roundtable in the hope that it 
further contributes to this significant area of policy consideration internationally. 
 
Attendance 
Event attendance was by invitation, and the following individuals participated: 
Stephen Glaister, Director, RAC Foundation; and Emeritus Professor of Transport and 
Infrastructure, Centre for Transport Studies, Imperial College London 
Phil Goodwin (Chair), Emeritus Professor of Transport Policy, UCL and UWE Bristol 
Peter Headicar, formerly Reader in Transport Planning, Oxford Brookes University (current 
Associate) 
Andrew Jackson, Deputy Chief Executive, New Zealand Ministry of Transport 
Peter Jones, Professor of Transport and Sustainable Development, Centre for Transport 
Studies, UCL 
Stephen Joseph, Chief Executive, Campaign for Better Transport 
Charilaos Latinopoulos, PhD student, Centre for Transport Studies, Imperial College 
London 
Glenn Lyons (organiser), Strategy Director, New Zealand Ministry of Transport (on 
secondment); and Professor of Transport and Society, UWE Bristol 
David Metz, Visiting Professor, Centre for Transport Studies, UCL 
Gordon Stokes, Honorary Visiting Research Associate, Transport Studies Unit, University 
of Oxford 





Part 2 – record of roundtable discussions 
In this main part of the report the key themes that arose during the discussion are 
summarised. Although there was a range of views on all issues, broadly the discussions in 
sections 1-6 below focus on more concrete issues and practical suggestions where 
considerable research has already been carried out, and sections 7-10 reflect a mixture of 
more speculative explanations, research which is less far advanced, and various ideas 
about the political implications.  
1 Lost in translation 
In the 1970s official forecasts of road traffic included allowance for an eventual saturation 
level of car ownership, car use and total car traffic (the expected point when this would 
occur being the first decade of the 21st century). While indicators of a turning point in the 
long run trend of car traffic growth can now be seen to date from the early 1990s, the 
phenomenon itself both in terms of its appearance in various countries’ national statistics 
and its subsequent examination by commentators has been much more recent. It has 
quickly acquired the label ‘peak car’ which can present a problem of communication – to 
policymakers and other stakeholders. ‘Peak car’ suggests an interpretation that car travel 
has indeed peaked. This should not be taken as axiomatic - rather, the discussion took the 
label as a shorthand for confronting uncertainty over whether or not car travel has peaked 
and contemplating the available evidence base and plausibility of three future alternatives 
– growing car travel, saturated car travel or declining car travel. 
Another matter that can be lost in translation is the distinction between car travel per capita 
and total car travel. It is the former that has been principally responsible for interest in the 
topic because of its implication that if car travel per capita is going down then something is 
changing in terms of the underlying drivers of demand relating to behaviour. However, it is 
possible that per capita car use could decline while total car use (and hence traffic volume) 
might still continue to increase as a result of population growth. From a policymaking 
perspective the latter can have as much if not more importance for certain areas of policy 
and investment. Therefore car travel per capita and total car travel should be explicitly 
distinguished. A key element of discussion is whether the resulting totals should be taken 
as proportional to population or some other conversion factor, depending on locations 
where population grows and the policy context in those places. 
Many forecasting models identify economic drivers as principal determinants of travel 
demand including real incomes, oil prices, and other transport prices. Examination of 
recent data on car travel suggests that a wider set of drivers may be at play including 
social, behavioural and lifestyle factors. There is wide agreement that this does not mean 
that the economic drivers no longer operate. However, their impact may be modified in 
size or structure – in economic terms, there will still be demand elasticities with respect to 
price or economic growth, but these may be different sizes (and in some circumstances 
even different signs), and subject to different influence, than has traditionally been 
assumed. The ‘peak car debate’ should not take the form of a false distinction between 
‘economic and psychological’ or ‘quantitative and qualitative’ influences. 
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There is a recognition that some rather entrenched positions may have got in the way of 
fostering collective engagement amongst policymakers, academics and practitioners. 
Perhaps the principal point that needs to be made is that any degree of professional 
consensus about the nature and extent of future demand is currently significantly 
diminished. There is little confidence that a single forecast, or narrow uncertainty band, 
represents a robust ‘most likely’ future, and there is a wider range of views and greater 
uncertainty of an unprecedented extent in recent times. If the fact of this greater range of 
views can be commonly recognised then a more collaborative approach can be adopted to 
address how this uncertainty might be reduced and how best to respond in policy and 
investment terms in the meantime. 
2 Divergent trends 
An important point already widely reported in the existing literature on recent 
developments in car travel is that of divergent trends that exist below aggregate national 
profiles of car travel per capita, i.e. that the trends for different areas, classes of travel or 
groups of the population are moving in different directions. Analysis of National Travel 
Survey data (for Great Britain) has revealed that car travel has gone down amongst men 
while up amongst women; it has gone down amongst young people and up amongst old 
people; it has gone down in London and some other cities and up in rural areas. The 
extent of divergent behaviours in different types of area for different types of people is 
significant in considering how total car travel will be affected by future population growth – 
the composition and spatial distribution of population matters hugely. Divergent behaviours 
are also not only related to cities versus smaller towns and rural areas but also to 
economically buoyant areas versus much less buoyant ones, not always in intuitively 
obvious directions. 
One ‘cartoon’ is that there are two ‘worlds’: (i) London and certain other cities with 
‘metropolitan’ characteristics with their trend towards less car use accompanied by rapid 
economic growth, increased population, increased densification, youth, immigration, and 
public transport growth; and (ii) ‘the rest of the country’ where trends still continue the 
previously dominant increases in car use, decline in public transport, and a tendency to 
suburbanisation. Similar divergence is seen in New Zealand with per capita car use 
recently decreasing in Wellington and Auckland and either being flat or growing elsewhere 
in the country (with growth largely being associated with remote rural areas). The 
discussion suggested that this is an oversimplification, and many of the trends seen in 
London are also seen, though in somewhat damped form, in some other areas – thus 
divergence is occurring, but ‘London versus the rest’ does not capture its characteristics.  
It is crucial to track and examine the diversity reflected by these two worlds. In turn that 
means that research on the behaviour of the aggregate total is important, but so is focus 
on those areas or groups whose behaviour shows departure from prevailing aggregate 
trends in both directions. Divergent trends matter. 
Another divergent trend worthy of note is that of under and over projection of future 
demand. For future car travel, forecasts (since about 1989 in the UK) have been 
successively revised downwards underlining a tendency to over-predict. (Though it should 
also be noted that the accuracy of transport forecasts depends also on the accuracy of 
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forecasts of exogenous input variables, as discussed  in section 6.) Meanwhile, the 
opposite has been true for rail in the UK – nearly all rail enhancements in recent years 
have substantially exceeded forecasts of use. Rail use nationally is also enjoying its 
highest ever levels. In the case of rail forecasts it is acknowledged that the forecasting 
models that are used are quite good at dealing with incremental change but not as good at 
dealing with step changes – whether internally or externally generated. Were both road 
and rail behaving in the same direction in relation to projections then this would have 
different avenues of possible explanation to those for the current situation. One might posit 
that there is some common oversight in both road and rail forecasts that is attributable to 
travel behaviour change determinants. 
3 Economic cycle effects 
It could be suggested that we have been provided with a tremendous international travel 
demand experiment with the global economic downturn in that we now have the emerging 
opportunity to discover whether indeed as employment and GDP recover so too does car 
travel per capita begin once again to increase (as there are some very early signs that it 
might be from the most recent data). However, the experiment may be problematic 
because there are two possibilities – firstly that the downturn has been a temporary 
disruption from which the long run trend in per capita car travel will recover (or will largely 
do so subject to any hysteresis effect); or secondly that the severity of this downturn (and 
indeed previous recessions) will itself have had a lasting impact on aspects of society and 
economic and social activity from which demand is derived. For example, there has been a 
marked increase seen in the most recent census (2011) of the proportion of the population 
which defines itself as part-time employed or self-employed. For these people it potentially 
moves beyond a matter of simply recording how much they earn at a particular survey 
point to the realities of the insecurity of agency work, zero hours contracts and the like. 
Fuelled by the global economic downturn, this may not only have altered the labour market 
for good but it may have changed the whole attitude towards taking on substantial financial 
commitment such as that associated with car ownership or home ownership. It will be a 
long time before we can establish definitely whether the economic crisis itself has had only 
temporary or more long-lasted structural effects. 
In addition, there is an unresolved issue about the extent to which first levelling off and 
then recent downturns in car travel have been due to the state of the economy or due to 
other factors. The argument here has mainly been in terms of the timing of the changes in 
trend. Have they in fact been contemporaneous with, or subsequent to, changes in the 
economic factors and downturns in national economies from 2008 onwards? This begs the 
question – is enough attention being given to studying and understanding effects 
(including policy responses and their effects) from economic conditions before the current 
recession? It has been suggested in recent work that the start of some of the observed 
changes can be traced back to much earlier developments: the upswing of an earlier 
economic cycle – change in youth driving licence acquisition was already recognised by 
2005 as having slowed down some ten years earlier; car mode share in London had 
peaked around 1990 (and is now down to around 37% - much of this change occurring 
pre- global economic downturn). Indeed, emerging from the last significant recession in the 
early 1990s, following an earlier period of considerable traffic growth in the late 1980s, 
8 
 
coincided with UK data showing a change from increasing traffic intensity of the economy 
to decreasing intensity. In other words decoupling of economic growth from traffic growth 
started to be observed in the period 1992-4. The same is true of shifts in land use and 
patterns of internal migration. The hypothesis that traffic growth and economic growth will 
both ‘return to normal’ depends on examination of how we expect traffic intensity of 
economic activity to change in future, which has so far been little considered yet this is 
surely key to matters (picked up below) of transport investment decisions. 
4 Equilibrium not saturation 
There is a long held hypothesis that car travel per capita should reach saturation over time 
as people are afforded the opportunity to reach their desired levels of consumption: Official 
forecasts of traffic in the UK made this assumption during the 1970s and early 1980s 
(suggesting at that time that saturation levels of car use would occur at around 2010). One 
hypothesis is that as technological advance has enabled us to travel faster and further to 
access people, goods, services and opportunities, we may be reaching a point where we 
have (at the average) all the access we require. An alternative hypothesis is that any 
flattening off in per capita demand may reflect a state of equilibrium being reached for the 
prevailing travel, economic and social conditions. In the UK, major road building has not 
been a feature of policy and investment for some 20 years and it may be that this limitation 
on capacity provision has resulted in a ‘containment of demand’ with the results in terms 
patterns of behaviour now emerging. In this case if strategic road capacity were to be 
substantially increased, and greater road traffic speeds permitted, it would be likely that 
more miles would be travelled as road users moved to establish a new equilibrium. (If this 
hypothesis is a significant contributing factor, it would imply that the feedback relationship 
of capacity changes on demand has rather large effects, with induced traffic being a 
substantial part of future traffic, as well as exogenous growth, and both needing to be 
taken account of in the forecasts.) 
5 Policy developments affect car use 
Alongside underlying economic drivers, key factors identified in the ‘peak car’ literature to 
date as also contributing to an explanation of changing car use include: (i) the behaviour of 
young people and a reduced commitment to learning to drive and own their first car (this 
has been influenced by changes in policy on driving tests, as well as wider public 
engagement in education on environmental issues, and changes in the insurance market 
reflecting age-related risk of accidents; it may also be influenced by changes in higher 
education – see later); and (ii) the locational distribution of a growing population (in terms 
of both per capita and in turn total car travel). There can be a tendency to view transport 
policy as something which must respond to such key factors, drivers and changing 
demand rather than itself influencing the drivers and factors which in turn influence 
demand. However it is suggested that past UK policies may, importantly, also be partly 
responsible for the dampening of car travel. This builds upon the equilibrium theory above. 
There have been some big policy changes that were introduced in the 1990s onwards in 
the UK. In particular land use policy (with a recognised interaction with transport) focused 
upon urban containment, brownfield development, restriction of out-of-town shopping and 
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the introduction of maximum rather than minimum parking standards (i.e. restraint). Such 
policy effects would have taken a number of years to become fully manifest – compatible 
with noticeable consequences being seen in car travel data from the early 2000s onwards, 
when the long term tendency for migration from cities to smaller towns and rural areas was 
reversed, with the consequence of reducing pressures for car use rather than increasing 
them. Another policy change which has been shown to contribute to effects on car use has 
been that concerning company car tax in the UK which moved from having perverse 
incentives to drive more in some cases to making company cars relatively less attractive. 
Thus policy measures may have been more effective than they have been given credit for 
– largely because of the lag effects between policy formulation and implementation, and 
resulting influences on demand (with such lag effects straddling different political 
administrations). 
Similarly in New Zealand, policy and investment may have been impacting on car travel 
rather than (only) responding to it. Lower (or under) investment in transport infrastructure 
capacity up to and at the point of change in the trend in car travel data in around 2004 
(before the global economic downturn) may have contributed to this observed change in 
demand. The subsequent attention being given to higher investment now in New Zealand 
with road capacity expansion is conversely likely to itself bring about an upward influence 
on demand. Indeed based on assumptions of improved accessibility bringing about greater 
economic activity and as a consequence generating more traffic, this might be considered 
a not unreasonable political response to the challenge of driving economic recovery. 
However, this makes a presupposition of there being a (strong) coupling between 
economic activity and traffic – something not necessarily borne out in practice where 
urbanisation is drawing upon agglomeration, densification and improved alternatives to car 
use to bring about a reduction in car mode share while maintaining economic vitality – as 
is the case with London. 
The importance of the policy effects on, rather than responses to, changing car use raises 
the need to distinguish between factors which are external and outside of the control of 
public policy and investment (where market forces are at work) and those which are 
internal and within control. (There is also a distinction between transport authorities and 
agencies and other public policy areas across government.) 
6 Robustness and risk 
There has always been to a greater or lesser extent the approach by government of 
producing ‘high’ and ‘low’ forecasts rather than a single projection of future car travel. 
These different forecasts tend to be based upon the same underlying assumptions but with 
different input values. This results in some acknowledgement of uncertainty about the 
future with an apparent envelope of possibility. It is manifest that professional views on this 
envelope (and any central projection within it) now span a wider range than used to be the 
case. 
With this in mind it is significant to note the dependence that other parts of government 
have on official road traffic forecasts – for example in relation to income from fuel tax for 
the Treasury or estimating transport’s future contribution to UK carbon emissions. 
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Meanwhile road traffic forecasts are dependent on GDP forecasts. Forecasting models 
and decision making that derives from them are subject to both internal assumptions as 
well as assumptions about input parameter values. Uncertainty can be at risk of being 
concealed in such forecasting which is why scenario planning (as a complement to, rather 
than substitute for, forecasting) has grown in appeal. This is especially important where 
‘game changing’ developments in society are contemplated. Game changers might include 
changing energy supplies, driverless cars or localised goods production (3-D printing). 
Given that ‘peak car’ debates are unlikely to be resolved with full consensus or confidence 
for some years, a review of policy appraisal approaches is needed which gives greater 
attention to policy and investment robustness in the face of outcomes which may be 
outside the narrow traditional envelope of statistical error bands. Thus estimates of benefit-
cost ratios (and strategic fit and deliverability) need to be considered for a wider range of 
futures than is done at present. In commercial terms this would be described as a need to 
consider both upside and downside risks of policy measures in the face of different 
possible futures. In the current situation of an apparent tendency to overestimate traffic 
growth it is argued that upside and downside risks are not symmetrical, but there is a 
greater probability of forecasts being overestimated than underestimated (hence the 
progressive downward revisions in the last 25 years). This is especially true of major 
scheme investments. 
Robustness needs also to be considered in terms of ‘portfolios’ of schemes and measures 
rather than considering individual schemes or measures in isolation, and tested against 
whether they only perform well under a narrow range of assumed futures, or under a wider 
range of conditions. It is recognised that addressing this would in turn require an 
appropriate means of explaining to policy makers that there is a wider range of possible 
futures than is implied by the envelope of ‘upper and lower’ assumptions which may be 
included in traffic forecasts. There is a range of views about the practical aspects of 
handling this matter. 
7 Opportunity beckons 
Taking forward the equilibrium theory above, allied to policy consequences, then raises an 
interesting question: if public policy is contributing to the system state that then dictates a 
corresponding equilibrium state for system use, what would be the right equilibrium to aim 
for? The question suggests that many of the issues considered to be related to forecasting 
matters could in fact be related to decision making matters. Rather than public policy trying 
to establish where it thinks future society and travel demand will be and respond to it, it is 
faced with the prospect of making decisions regarding where we want to be in future. 
The greater uncertainty which is now surrounding future demand (notwithstanding that 
public policy alone is not responsible for shaping that demand) might be seen as 
problematic to policymaking. However, the reasoning above suggests that uncertainty 
represents an opportunity. Faced with diminished confidence in predicting in order to 
provide, one has to move to a different question of choice in terms of what should be 
provided in order to try and influence a desirable equilibrium for society. This may appear 
to represent a significant change of mind set for policymakers and indeed it may be so for 
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certain countries (or many – especially in the face of pursuing economic recovery). 
However, from an economics perspective this is not radically new thinking and formed a 
basis for the work of the Eddington Study in the UK (2006). Predicting demand is seen to 
represent something which has a ‘price’ variable in a generalised cost sense (i.e. not 
simply monetary cost). This being the case, economic modelling can consider how the 
demand can be influenced by price and level of congestion to achieve a ‘desirable 
equilibrium’. The Eddington Study did this with two scenarios – one involving road 
investment without road pricing and one involving less road investment but with road 
pricing. Although the difference in total vehicle miles of traffic between the scenarios was 
small, the consequences for infrastructure strategy and congestion were very substantial, 
there being some 80% less expanded road capacity warranted under CBA assumptions 
with the reduced traffic volume, and less congestion, resulting from optimal road pricing. 
Opportunity itself can of course become problematic because it suggests scope for choice 
both about the future state we wish to reach and also the policies and measures that may 
enable us to get there. Future generations may not necessarily agree with the choices 
made today and the consequences of related policies and measures. It is also recognised 
that there are controversial differences of opinion today about the right balance between 
the pursuit of economic growth as an imperative in a globalising economy and the pursuit 
of environmental, social and health goals. However, in this case it is argued that the 
chosen balance does not of itself solve the question about whether or not car travel 
increase is an inevitable accompaniment, result of, condition for or barrier to economic 
success. Thus the selection of infrastructure for capacity increases does not follow simply 
from the choice of goals, but from an evidence-based assessment of its effects. Choice 
politically will also invariably be driven by the perceived imperatives of the time – the 
relative emphasis on economic, social and environmental considerations is likely to alter at 
different stages of the economic cycle. 
One manifestation of policy choice might be labelled the ‘green metropolis’ – epitomised 
by London but potentially replicable elsewhere globally. This is a mega city in which 
population is growing but without additional road capacity for car traffic, meanwhile allied 
to densification and investment in rail-based public transport. It is fascinating that so much 
new housing stock as part of densification is focused on where planners would wish it to 
be and also that quite expensive, high-rise accommodation is acceptable and perhaps 
desirable to younger, richer, lower car ownership individuals – accommodation that 
described loosely 50 years ago would have been seen as a ‘council flat’. With low mode 
share for car in the face of these conditions and the speed and reliability of rail (compared 
to bus) it is possible to deliver a city that is economically and socially vibrant (and which 
has lower per capita carbon emissions). However, for other cities to realise this policy goal 
is a potentially complex proposition and it is unclear whether or not the logic would hold 
true for smaller scale urban areas. In terms of such policy choices this is also in the 
context of questions over equity of investment choices that may disproportionately favour 
one geographic area over another. 
8 Winds of digital change 
Interest in the ‘peak car’ phenomenon has been driven by data suggesting that something 
different and important is happening – in a number of countries (albeit not all for exactly 
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the same reasons). Examination of the phenomenon has, understandably and helpfully, 
been focused upon empirical evidence. The UK is world leading in its longitudinal capture 
and reporting of transport statistics, accompanied by other national surveys which help 
paint a ‘measured’ picture of UK society. However, certain forms of data are more 
commonplace than others across a number of countries. Less data exists to allow 
comparison across locations and over time regarding the impacts of the digital age on 
society and in turn transport. The ‘peak car’ literature does acknowledge the possible 
contribution of the digital age to changing demand for car use but in the face of limited 
suitable empirical evidence this appears to be given less prominence than other potential 
factors. Much research has been undertaken on seeking to understand the relationships 
between information and communication technologies (ICTs) and travel. However, this has 
tended to focus upon particular activities or technologies and look for isolated cause-effect 
relationships; and much of the research has concerned the period before mobile online 
technologies became ubiquitous. 
It can be hypothesised that in practice the effects of the digital age are permeating society 
in a complex, subtle and cumulative way such that the consequences for car travel are 
becoming significant but are challenging empirically to substantiate. 2014 marks the 25th 
birthday of the world wide web. For many of the years over the period of its existence, 
major new digital innovations have emerged and been absorbed into (parts of) society – 
search engines, e-shopping, social media, smartphones and so on. One hypothesis is that 
society is in the midst of a transition from the regime of the motor age into something 
different – and strongly shaped by the digital age. Major transitions have, historically, taken 
several decades to become fully apparent. For New Zealand it took some 60 years to 
transition fully from sailing ships to steam ships. A similar period of time elapsed in 
transitioning from horse-drawn transport to motorised transport. The transition potentially 
now surrounding us is one from a society in which accessibility is dominated by physical 
mobility and especially by the car to a future regime where accessibility will be more 
strongly shaped and represented (alongside the car) by digital age interaction. The car, it 
can be suggested, is gradually or not so gradually being overcast by digital connectivity 
such that it will no longer be the dominant defining force of our culture and social and 
economic activity. 
Such a hypothesis inevitably provokes a question of whether any evidence exists that such 
a transition has really started to happen. This is difficult to address for reasons stated 
above – relationships between ICTs and travel are multifaceted, interactive and changing 
over time. A longstanding area of interest has been that of teleworking with presumptions 
of growing substitution effects. Evidence can suggest that there has been little change in 
levels of teleworking over time. Yet such evidence can be hampered by problems of 
definition and measurement in the face of an increasing diversity of flexible working 
practices. For instance, previous national survey data in the US was based on a question 
asking ‘where is your normal place of work?’ – such a question would not capture those 
working at or from home for only part of their time (which is known from UK data to have 
been a growing form of flexible working). There is some recent work using Scottish data 
examining the relationship between internet use and car driving mileage. People with low 
internet use and very high internet use tended to have lower car use and people with 
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intermediate internet use had higher car use. Reasons for lower car use may be 
associated with lack of access to a car for one group and substitution effects from high 
internet use for another group. 
The hypothesis above might appear to be in conflict with observed (re)urbanisation and 
associated lower car use because it had previously been assumed that ICTs would bring 
about a ‘death of distance’ such that people could locate more remotely and still participate 
economically (a contributor to urban sprawl). However, while this may be the case for 
some (perhaps those moving into (semi) retirement), urban living can be a natural 
accompaniment to digital age engagement where people can take advantage of public 
transport use to remain digitally engaged on the move. It may also be the case that being 
proximate some of the time is a feature of a service economy. Alternatively or as a 
complement, travel time use with the support of digital technologies may have contributed 
significantly to rail use attractiveness for business and commuting thus connecting people 
from outside urban centres without recourse to (as much) car travel. It must be noted, 
nevertheless, that public transport use remains a small part of the overall travel market. 
There may also be significant consequences for future travel time use and its influence on 
modal preferences according to whether or not self-driving cars become a mainstream 
feature of future transport (and whether or not public policy chooses to encourage this). 
9 Changing norms 
Higher education policy in the UK may have had a major effect on promoting young 
people’s appetite for urban living and diminishing their appetite or need for car use through 
changing social norms. There has been a national policy for some years of increasing the 
proportion of young people going to university allied, more recently, to higher education 
becoming more expensive. This has resulted in large proportions of young people 
spending a significant period of their early adult lives in university towns and cities where 
they are amongst others who for various reasons also do not have a car. They spend 3-5 
years in a less car dependent existence where social norms and pressures to be a car 
user (or certainly a driver) are much diminished. This is allied to an ability to stay 
connected and co-ordinate their social networking through digital technology. They can 
also more easily take advantage of public transport services through the availability of 
travel information services. Affordance of a car, influenced by disposable income levels, 
may still remain a significant and ultimate determinant of eventual car use – and yet 
changes to social norms may create more inertia to remain car ‘independent’. 
There remains much more to be learnt about factors influencing young people’s car use. It 
was reported that recent work yet to be published suggests that young people’s lifestyles 
and car use are affected by whether or not they are in full time work, part time or not 
employed, and also by housing costs and remaining living longer with parents. 
10 Political perspectives 
An issue that is not new but which now perhaps has even greater importance is the need 
to bridge between technical insights and expert advice and political realities. The approach 
to making decisions in times of uncertainty is key. There is a major challenge in moving 
policymakers away from orthodox thinking associated with long-run trends (in the face of 
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some uncertainty) to a space where plausible yet divergent possible futures should be 
contemplated which may present radically different possibilities in terms of policy and 
investment choices and associated risks (and returns). 
This returns us to the issue of communication and engagement associated with the ‘peak 
car’ debates. A politician’s role is to lead the electorate and create a sense of confidence 
and assurance – acknowledging uncertainty is not a comfortable place to be and to 
engage with. Thus it would seem that attention needs to be focused upon the possible 
virtues of opportunity that uncertainty can present. In this regard there remains much to be 
gained from better understanding how demand for car travel has responded to past 
events, especially in relation to policy initiatives, in order that greater confidence can be 
taken from being able to maintain or resurrect such policies (or to introduce new ones) in 
order to effect change that may be desirable – whether viewed from an economic, social or 
environmental point of view. In this light, it is of some concern that in the UK (outside of 
London) we are currently sorely lacking a robust planning framework. 
Closing remarks 
Participants at the workshop agreed that the roundtable discussion had been a worthwhile 
undertaking and that a forum for some form of continuation of knowledge sharing and 
discussion on this important topic would be appropriate. The event on this occasion has 
benefitted from the initiative and support of the New Zealand Ministry of Transport and the 
generosity of time given free of charge by the participants. Future undertakings, 
reminiscent of the OECD’s International Transport Forum work referred to on page 2, 
would be welcome, with resources to support the activity. Given the ultimate significance 
for policymakers of the topic it would also be welcome to see more national governments 
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Initial thinking for 20 May roundtable on ‘peak car’ from Glenn Lyons 
What are the most noteworthy factors likely to have been contributing to recent changes in per capita 
car travel? 
 Cumulative effects of society moving deeper into the digital age: changing where and when 
activities are undertaken, enriching and reshaping interactions with others, influencing location 
decisions and diminishing, at least to some extent, the primacy of the low occupancy car for 
accessing people, goods, services and opportunities. 
 The assertion above is difficult if not impossible to unpack and conclusively support 
empirically. There is evidence at more specific levels. For example, between 2007 and 2013 
internet use for a range of activities increased substantially (e.g. internet banking, selling goods or 
services, internet phone/video calls). In 2010, 15% of people in paid employment worked a least 
one full day a week from home – up by 35% from 1997. However, one may not necessarily 
observe cause and effect in such specific data since the cumulative effect of our move into 
the digital age is more profound. It embodies or at least overlaps with some of the more specific 
considerations of factors such as, notably, urbanisation and younger people acquiring driving 
licences alongside their attitudes towards travel. 
What would be the assumed drivers of each of the three trajectories forward of grow, peak or plateau? 
 Affordability of personal motorised mobility 
 Extent of coupling between economic activity and traffic levels (and the extent to which internet 
bandwidth can keep pace with demand for use) 
 Extent of co-operative behaviour affecting vehicle occupancy levels 
 Relative experiences of and perceptions of travel time use across different modes 
 Likelihood of autonomous driving becoming a mainstream reality 
 Political appetite to espouse regime transition or preserve the incumbent automobility regime 
Are these the only trajectories and to what extent might different trajectories concurrently prevail below 
the aggregate? 
 Just as the digital age is affecting some people more profoundly than others across society, so too 
will per capita car travel as has been evidenced already in recent analysis. It seems likely that 
concurrent trajectories will continue to prevail and that since these trajectories may well themselves 
not be linear, the aggregate trajectory itself may be ‘unstable’ for the period of years ahead 
suggesting a persistence of a rather inconclusive position on ‘peak car’. 
How should policymaking respond to the pronounced uncertainty surrounding future travel demand; 
and what does this uncertainty mean for how we invest in land transport and how we might look to build 


















































































































































Initial thoughts for the 20 May roundtable on “peak car” from Stephen 
Joseph 
 
Noteworthy factors contributing to recent changes in per capita car travel 
I think what others may have missed are the trends in public transport use in the UK. Rail use in particular has more or 
less doubled in the last 15-20 years. There is a large debate about the impact of rail privatisation (1993-7) on this, but 
certainly a programme of investment in the last ten years, which is accelerating, has helped.  However, even in networks 
with limited investment – notably the local rail services in the northern cities and even some rural branch lines – there 
has been huge growth in patronage. Similarly, as David Metz points out, growth in public transport use in London has 
been huge.   
I think the urbanisation identified by Peter Headicar is an explanation for this – for example, the economic structure of 
the north of England changed, so that employment moved from industry – based in northern “mill towns” to services, 
which ended up (partly through planning policy) being based in the city centres. This created “rail friendly” growth.  
I know we’re discussing cars, but it should be noted that GB rail freight has also grown significantly (although from a 
low base), and now accounts for (for example) around a third of tonnage from the ports of Southampton and Felixstowe. 
Here there is some evidence that privatisation has helped, giving rail freight operators guaranteed “slots” on the network 
and hence enabling them to match or exceed road’s performance.  
Other public transport has been much more mixed – overall, bus use has declined outside London, but there are pockets 
of high bus use depending on local operators and councils.   
Assumed drivers of the three trajectories 
‐ Urbanisation: as Peter Headicar says, land use patterns and policies are key. A loosened planning system may 
lead to increased traffic, but denser development may counter this 
‐ Investment in roads vs non-car alternatives: significant investment planned on the railways will drive change, 
especially if a new high speed rail network is built. At local level, investment in cycling in various forms may 
be a driver of change too, alongside other “pull” measures (car clubs, public realm improvements etc). On the 
other hand, big road investment allied to ex-urban development may counter this.  
‐ New technologies – both transport (real time information, smartcards etc) and non-transport (continued growth 
of digital technology where cities/ public transport have advantages over ex-urban/ cars) will influence travel 
patterns 
Different trajectories? 
Definitely we can see this. City regions may follow London and car use will plateau and may reduce, while we may see 
growth in inter-urban traffic and in rural areas, especially if planning policy allows more car-based ex-urban 
development 
Responses of policy-makers  
‐ Scenarios rather than forecasts 
‐ Multi-modal rather than single-mode plans 
‐ Linking transport and land use planning 
And an interesting question – maybe devolved city-region authorities, like London, will manage all this better if 
sufficiently resourced and with the right capacity and capabilities   
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Comment after the seminar by Phil Goodwin  
1. Aggregate test of NTM ability to track recent years’ traffic volume 
The DfT has published suggestions that the forecasting errors made using NTM in recent years have mainly 
been due to wrong input values of population, income growth and fuel prices, and reported briefly  that if 
the input values had been correct, the model’s forecast would have tracked reasonably well the actual 
outcome.  However, there are some features which make it seem that the test is not quite as persuasive as 
has been reported. These are: 
 The tests have been done by a combination of retrospective runs of the model with corrected input 
data, and application of a reduced form of the model, at aggregate level, excluding certain 
important elements, for example, the feedback effect of congestion. This would appear to be a very 
interesting and important argument but has been difficult for outside commentators to assess 
because the detailed method, spread‐sheets, calculations and results have not been published; 
only a graph and a few paragraphs of explanation are available. It would be very helpful if the test 
could be reported in sufficient detail to enable others to reproduce the results, or otherwise. 
 The reduced form tests have used aggregate demand elasticities intended to be consistent with 
those derived from the complex pattern of parameters in the model. However, the model uses 
relationships implying long term equilibrium elasticities, on the argument that its main use is to 
predict traffic volumes many years in the future. It is empirically well established (and accepted by 
DfT) that long term elasticities, which take of the order of 5‐10 years to settle down, are 
substantially bigger, by a factor of around 2, than the elasticities which apply within a year of 
changes in the cost, income etc. (There is also a smaller amount of evidence that at least some 
elasticities are not symmetrical in the short run, notably that the effects of income reductions on 
car use have been less than the effect of equal and opposite increases). In this case however the 
revised forecasts relate to a year‐by‐year tracking of short term effects. Prima facie the 
performance test of the model is based on the assumption that the short term elasticities are as big 
as the previously assumed long term equilibrium effects. If that is valid, it would imply that the true 
long term effects could be bigger than has been assumed. It is difficult to conclude that the same 
explicit or implied elasticities are valid for the short and long term at the same time as accepting 
the empirical evidence (and theoretical expectation) that they are different.  
 The third issue is that even if the model’s parameters are capable of accurately producing an 
aggregate trajectory of demand, for national totals, that is rarely the main use to which it is put: 
rather, it is used as a guide for regional or sectoral  forecasts relevant to specific projects. It is 
known, for example, that its forecasts for London are substantially wrong, and there is much 
interest in whether there are corresponding errors for specific other areas, especially cities, even 
after allowing for corrected input variables. This would be a more testing test, and give insights into 
whether (for example) there are some areas of systematic overestimate and others of systematic 
underestimate. 
For these reasons I do think that tests of the model’s performance under different assumptions of the input 
data would be extremely useful and full of insights, but it needs to be done with the full version of the 
model, careful thought about the implications of short and long term elasticities, break‐downs into the 
classes of area or population which are material to the current debate, and full publication or access to the 
detailed technical results. Ideally the method of carrying out the analysis would be collaborative1 involving 
both in‐house and external analysts.  
                                                            
1 There is a long unresolved issue about people outside the DfT having access to the model, so that they can 
run it independently, varying assumptions or input values, and trying their own preferred policy tests. It 
would be good if progress could be made on this – I understand that the barrier of some parts of the model 
using a proprietary code is now easily solvable. 
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2.Policy implications of different forecasts 
It is often assumed that if traffic forecasts are lower this will reduce the case for road capacity increases, 
and if they are higher this will strengthen the case. For that reason there is sometimes a tendency for 
people or institutions to be more or less receptive to the evidence according to whether they feel more or 
less comfortable about these policy implications.  
Quite apart from the need for all policy appraisal to be based on the best possible evidence about the 
effects, without the sort of double‐guessing that could lead to bias, I don’t think the assumption is actually 
true; the effect of different forecasts on the choice of best‐fitting policies is actually more complex and in 
some cases runs in the opposite direction. To take the case of expanding road infrastructure, policy 
approval will be influenced by a range of different factors, of which two (among many) are (a) the 
estimated size of the BCR as a measure of value for money, and (b) an assessment of whether people will 
experience an improvement in travelling conditions as a result. These are not equivalent: the BCR will be 
calculated against a counterfactual do‐minimum or do‐nothing future, whereas ‘improvement’ is 
experienced against a factual present situation.  
If the forecasts are very high, the estimated BCR will be high, but the possibility of experiencing 
improvement will be small: the outcome will be ‘making things worse more slowly’. If the forecasts are low, 
then the BCRs will be lower but the effects of expanding infrastructure is more likely to result in reduced 
congestion which will be experienced by road users. Multiplying these two probabilities together, my 
hypothesis is that there is likely to be a curve whose maximum – where support for specific schemes will be 
highest – is at a level substantially below the current forecasts, maybe of the order of about 10% growth 
over the forecasting period.   
Note that the experience of the period from 1992‐1998, under both Conservative and Labour governments, 
showed exactly this feature. The traffic forecasts were so high that no road building strategy could actually 
make traffic conditions better, in spite of the claimed high benefit‐cost ratios. This was one of the driving 
forces for all parties to undertake policy reappraisal in the period, and why the Eddington report favoured 
road pricing.   
We are likely to see another aspect of the same problem in the near future, when considering the 
performance targets which are set for the new Highways Company. It is most unlikely that successful 
performance would be judged by their ability to argue that conditions, though getting worse, are doing so 
more slowly than would otherwise be the case: there will be a natural desire to have performance 
measures which show what improvements are being made. But setting ex post performance measures 
which are different from ex ante appraisal criteria would produce considerable tension, and probably 
disappointment.  
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Initial thoughts after 20 May roundtable on ‘peak car’ from Charilaos Latinopoulos and Scott Le Vine 
Peak	Car,	Young	Adults,	and	Economic	Performance	
A line of research is needed to better distinguish between effects due to the downward trend in young adults’ 
economic activity and other hypotheses that involve less well‐understood mechanisms (e.g. online‐connectivity, 
changing attitudes towards cars, effects of migration).  The chart below shows that even among just tax‐paying 
young adults personal incomes trended down in the 2000s, while the opposite occurred for older adults.  People 
on zero or very low incomes are excluded from this analysis; it therefore is distinct from other trends such as the 
increase in young adults’ participation in higher education. 
 
Authors’ analysis of HMRC Survey of Personal Incomes 
It may well be that some or all of the less‐well‐understood hypotheses turn out to be significant contributors to 
‘Peak Car’.  The first order of business, however, is to identify how much of young adults’ falling auto‐mobility 
can be explained, in a statistical sense, by trends in their economic activity.   A better understanding of what has 
caused the diverging economic performance between younger and older adults is also required, in order to 
sensibly make predictions for future years.   
Research is also needed to quantify the degree to which the observed concentration of young adults in Britain’s 
cities is due to changing preferences (e.g. evolving social norms, delayed household formation, increased desire 
for urban amenities) versus changing constraints (e.g. the mis‐alignment between rising home prices in the early 
2000s and decreasing young adults’ incomes). 
Implications	
The notion of providing open access to the National Transport Model has been raised (by Phil Goodwin, writing 
in Local Transport Today).  Whilst we recognise that there are practical challenges (e.g. confidentiality 
agreements), we believe there is an overriding public interest in making it available for interested parties to use 
and alter (subject to suitable agreement).  The ‘Peak Car’ phenomenon – and its future trajectory – has very 
large implications indeed.  The question is too important for anything other than open public discourse that is as 
well‐informed as possible. 
A shift towards scenario‐based forecasting is most welcome.  DfT are currently studying techniques to better 
represent uncertainties in the NTM, both statistical uncertainty and others such as model specification, future 
technologies, and socio‐economic trends.  This is to be applauded. 
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